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Abstract
Many people do not know or believe there is a God, andmany experience
a sense of divine absence. Are these (and other) “divine hiddenness” facts
evidence against the existence of God? Using Bayesian tools, we investigate
evidential arguments from divine hiddenness, and respond to two objections
to such arguments. The first objection says that the problem of hiddenness is
just a special case of the problem of evil, and so if one has responded to the
problem of evil then hiddenness has no additional bite. The second objection
says that, while hiddenness may be evidence against generic theism, it is
not evidence against more specific conceptions of God, and thus hiddenness
poses no epistemic challenge to a theist who holds one of these more specific
conceptions. Our investigation leaves open just how strong the evidence
from hiddenness really is, but we aim to clear away some important reasons
for thinking hiddenness is of no evidential significance at all.
1 Hiddenness as Evidence
Are the prevalence of unbelief, the uneven distribution of religious experience, or
feelings of divine absence—in short, divine hiddenness—evidence against the exis-
tence of God? A related question that has received much more attention in the past
half century is whether the prevalence of evil and suffering are evidence against
the existence of God. In this essay, drawing lessons from the so-called eviden-
tial argument from evil, we discuss an analogous evidential argument from divine
hiddenness (Maitzen 2006; Anderson, forthcoming). This investigation provides
answers to two important objections to such an argument.
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Objection 1. The problem of divine hiddenness is just a special case
of the problem of evil. Once the problem of evil has been properly
taken into account, hiddenness has no additional bite.
Objection 2. While hiddenness may be evidence against a generic
form of theism, it is not evidence against more specific conceptions
of God—for instance, a God who is appropriately transcendent. So
hiddenness is not an epistemic challenge to a theist who holds one of
these narrower conceptions of God.
There is not just one respect in which God seems “hidden,” and accordingly there
is not just one evidential argument from hiddenness. We will consider a few dif-
ferent versions as we go. But, to be clear, we are thinking about hiddenness as
consisting in certain “ordinary” kinds of evidence—evidence about the distribu-
tion of religious belief and experience—rather than some kind of special “higher
level” evidence about what the balance of all of our other evidence is like. (For this
alternative approach see for example Schellenberg 1993, 208–9.) It is a common
ground fact that there are many people who do not believe in God even after sincere
sustained inquiry into the question, and likewise that many people feel that God is
absent. In contrast, claims about the balance of all of our non-hiddenness-related
evidence strike us as both more obscure and more tendentious.
Our approach deploys what we take to be the best general-purpose tools available
for reasoning about evidence and its strength—the tools of Bayesianism, broadly
construed. The main idea, in a slogan, is that evidential support is probability-
raising. A simple example: smoke in the air is evidence of fire. The Bayesian
construal of this fact is that Pr(Fire ∣ Smoke), the conditional probability of Fire
given Smoke, is higher than the unconditional probability Pr(Fire). Another equiv-
alent formulation is useful: Smoke is more probable in the presence of Fire than it
is in the absence of Fire. That is,
Pr(Smoke ∣ Fire) > Pr(Smoke ∣ ¬Fire)
We don’t take these Bayesian formulations to provide a reductive explanation of
evidential support in terms of a more basic thing, probability.1 Rather, we are
thinking of probability as a tool for regimenting and making precise questions of
evidential support.
1We also do not want to take on some controversial view about the nature of these probabilities,
whether as psychological states (degrees of belief), or frequencies, or chances.
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Outside of artificial examples or cases involving rich statistics, many of these prob-
abilities are hard to get a fix on. When we ask about, say, the probability of there
being widespread suffering conditional on there being no God, we shouldn’t be
confident in any very precise answers. But neither should we declare ourselves
completely at a loss—we are not in a realm of, as Plantinga once put it, “difficulty,
darkness, and despair” (Plantinga 1979, 10). Even without being able to put pre-
cise probabilities on (say) Smoke in the absence of Fire, we can still confidently
say that Smoke is evidence for Fire. We can reliably make some comparative judg-
ments, as well as imprecise judgments about probabilities that are particularly high,
middling, or low (compare discussion in Benton, Hawthorne, and Isaacs 2016).
Once the interaction between different pieces of evidence gets even a little compli-
cated, doing simple calculations—even with made-up or imprecise numbers—can
genuinely improve our understanding, by imposing some cognitive discipline that
helps defend our judgments from the many cognitive biases that beset our ordinary
intuitions. (For a popular overview, see Kahneman 2011, especially chapters 12–
17; see also Alexander 2013.) Philosophers often talk about whether one piece
of evidence “outweighs” another, or about the “balance” of evidence. These are
hard quantitative questions; using appropriate quantitative tools can make a real
difference.
What is evidence for what depends on the background context—on what other evi-
dence has already been taken into account. What is the evidential context in which
we are asking whether hiddenness is evidence against God? One natural thought
is that we should be taking advantage of everything relevant that we already know.
But this would trivialize the question, given that one of the things we already know
about is hiddenness itself. If 𝐸 is part of your background evidence, then the prob-
ability of 𝐸 given your background evidence is one. Thus, given your background
evidence, 𝐸 is equally probable given any hypothesis. The result is that 𝐸 is not
evidence for or against any hypothesis. When asking what some of our evidence
favors, we should not include all of our evidence as part of the background: some
evidence should be “bracketed.”
Besides the evidence at issue itself, we know many other things that are closely
related to it, which should also be set aside (compare Draper 2014, 134–35). In
the philosophy of science, this is called the problem of “old evidence” (Glymour
1980; see also Howson 1991; Barnes 1999). To evaluate the evidential force of
hiddenness, we need to bracket many things we know, including claims we have de-
duced from hiddenness, testimonial reports about hiddenness, and evidence about
the effects of hiddenness. This is not straightforward, and it is not entirely clear
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what should be set aside. We take this to be chiefly a pragmatic question: there is
not a single correct way to bracket. The reason we are asking what this evidence
supports is as a step on the way to evaluating what all our evidence supports. We
are breaking up a complicated question into more tractable parts. Eventually, what-
ever is bracketed now will still need to be taken into account. Bracketing evidence
is a matter of choosing a sensible order in which to take up evidential questions,
since we can’t tackle every question at once.
One kind of evidence that we will be bracketing—for now—is distinctively the-
ological evidence. For instance, we can find in Plantinga the suggestion that the
doctrine that “our world is fallen, broken, in need of restoration; and human beings
… are in need of repentance, reconciliation, salvation” (Plantinga 1996, 256) may
have the status of evidence.2 Including this sort of proposition as part of the back-
ground evidence will make data about evil and divine hiddenness substantially less
surprising. Depending on exactly how we spell out this doctrine, perhaps it even
entails such things. If such doctrines are themselves evidence, then in an evidential
context where they are not bracketed, very plausibly neither evil nor hiddenness
will count as evidence against theism.
In section 3, we will consider how distinctively theological evidence might make
a difference. We think this is subtle, and there are pitfalls in appealing to such
evidence. For the first part of this essay, we set it aside: we will bracket such
propositions as the Fall, as well as theism itself, and related religious doctrines.
But to be clear, this is not because we are assuming there can be no such evidence,
nor that it is irrelevant. We just think it is complicated. One thing at a time.
2 Plantinga (1996) argues against setting aside his belief in the Fall, in a context where he seems
to be treating these beliefs as background evidence for the purpose of evaluating probabilities. We
find the more explicit suggestion that this doctrine might be evidence by putting together some
things Plantinga says in several different places. Consider this example from “Advice to Christian
Philosophers”:
Suppose we say that 𝑇𝑠 is the relevant body of total evidence for a given theist 𝑇 .
… Now what sorts of propositions are to be found in 𝑇𝑠? Perhaps the propositions
he knows to be true, or perhaps the largest subset of his beliefs that he can rationally
accept without evidence from other propositions, or perhaps the propositions he
immediately-knows, but does not know on the basis of other propositions. However
exactly we characterize this set 𝑇𝑠, the question I mean to press is this: why can’t
belief in God be itself a member of 𝑇𝑠? (Plantinga 1984, 260)
Plantinga might well say the same thing about other doctrines, such as the Fall. In Warranted
Christian Belief (2000) Plantinga argues that many substantive religious doctrines can be known
(and perhaps immediately known) by the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit.
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2 Hiddenness and Evil
The first question we will investigate is how evidence from hiddenness interacts
with evidence from evil. First, a ground-clearing point. Sometimes it is natural to
think of putting together different pieces of evidence as simply a matter of “adding
them up.” Common metaphors about “weighing” or “balancing” evidence suggest
this picture. You have various pieces of evidence with different weights on the-
ism’s side of the scale, and various other pieces of evidence on the opposite side,
and the balance of evidence is a matter of adding up the weights on each side. But
that isn’t generally how it works: different pieces of evidence can interact in non-
trivial ways. Take a simple example. Your friend draws a card from a well-shuffled
deck and tells you two things about it.
(E1) The card is either a heart or the ace of spades.
(E2) The card is either a diamond or the ace of spades.
Each of these pieces of evidence taken on its own is evidence for the hypothesis
that the card is red. But, taken together, they tell you that the card is the ace of
spades, and so not red.3
When you are aggregating evidence, you can consider the evidential import of each
proposition one by one; but as you do, the context changes. At each step, every-
thing you have already taken into account should be included as part of the relevant
background evidence. In the example above, E2 taken in isolation is evidence for a
red card, but with respect to background evidence that includes E1, E2 is evidence
against a red card.4
3Plantinga (1979, 4) offers a similar example illustrating a closely related point.
4 There is a perfectly fine quantitative notion of strength of evidence that can be simply added
up, as long as we are careful about the context in this way. The notion of strength of evidence we
are relying on here is the log Bayes factor. The unconditional log Bayes factor for hypothesis 𝐻
and evidence 𝐸 is
log Pr(𝐸 ∣ 𝐻)Pr(𝐸 ∣ ¬𝐻) .
The conditional log Bayes factor for hypothesis 𝐻 and evidence 𝐸2 given evidence 𝐸1 is
log Pr(𝐸2 ∣ 𝐻 & 𝐸1)Pr(𝐸2 ∣ ¬𝐻 & 𝐸1)
.
There is nothing magical about using logarithms here: putting strengths on a log scale is just what
lets us talk about literally adding the strengths together, rather than multiplying them. Then we can
calculate the overall strength of evidence 𝐸1, 𝐸2, 𝐸3, … for or against 𝐻 by adding together the
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With that out of the way, let’s turn to the central question of this section. We have
lots of evidence about various evils. We also have lots of evidence about various
ways in which God is hidden or seems absent. How do these two kinds of evidence
interact?
One natural thought that one often finds is that, if hiddenness is a kind of evil, there
is no extra work for hiddenness to do once evil has been taken into account—there
is no special problem of divine hiddenness. For instance, Kvanvig writes,
Yet, it is also obvious that the problem of hiddenness is but a special
instance of the problem of evil, the epistemic weight of which has al-
ready been factored in. So how could hiddenness be a further problem,
a further piece of information to be weighed in the balance? (2001,
160)
One very simple version of this thought gets things backwards. Here’s an example.
Inhabited exoplanets are a special instance of exoplanets. So if you already know
there are inhabited exoplanets, then the evidence that there are exoplanets does
nothing extra for you, since it follows from what you already knew. But if what
you already know is that there are exoplanets, finding out that there is some special
instance of exoplanets—for example, that there are inhabited exoplanets—is still
very important and newsworthy. Likewise, if hiddenness is indeed a species of
the genus evil (and we already know this) then, this means that hiddenness entails
evil—not the other way around. So while hiddenness may still carry evidential
weight conditional on evil, evil cannot carry evidential weight conditional on hid-
denness. This version of the idea “hiddenness is a special instance of evil, so
hiddenness does nothing once you have evil on the scales” has things backwards.
(To be clear, we are not saying Kvanvig or anyone else endorses this simplistic
unconditional log Bayes factor for 𝐻 and 𝐸1, together with the conditional log Bayes factor for 𝐻
and 𝐸2 given 𝐸1, and then the conditional log Bayes factor for 𝐻 and 𝐸3 given 𝐸1 and 𝐸2, and so
on. (An important fact is that the order in which we take 𝐸1, 𝐸2, … does not make a difference to
the final result of this calculation.) In a way this way of thinking about the strength of evidence
vindicates the “weighing” metaphor—except that the “weight” of an object in the balance depends
on which other objects are already there. (Also, if the prior probabilities of the two sides are not
equal, then the metaphorical scale should tip one way on its own before any evidence is added to
it.)
Poston (2018) considers the simplified case where each piece of evidence 𝐸1, 𝐸2, … is indepen-
dent of the others conditional on 𝐻 , and also conditional on ¬𝐻 . This is sometimes called the
Naïve Bayes condition. In this much simplified case, the unconditional Bayes factors are the same
as the conditional Bayes factors, so we can simply consider the strength of each piece of evidence
separately and add them up.
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thought, but we think it is a natural enough mistake to be worth clearing up.)
That is to say, the evidence that there is some evil or other does not do further
work, conditional on hiddenness (supposing hiddenness is itself known to be an
evil). But the problem of evil does not arise merely from the existence of some
evil or other: different kinds of evil matter in different ways. For a well-known
example, Adams (1989) pointed out that the existence of horrendous evils poses a
significantly different problem from the existence of evil in general. There is not
just one problem of evil, but many. Hiddenness may well be one of them, but that
does not mean it deserves any less special attention than any of the other problems
of evil. Hiddenness and other specific types of bad thing can make different ev-
idential contributions, and are worth considering separately. As it turns out, we
think it’s unclear that classifying hiddenness as an “evil” is really helpful at all.
We will argue below that some of the reasons why hiddenness might count against
theism don’t owe their strength to the badness of hiddenness at all.
A different natural thought is that whatever responseswemight have to the problem
of evil will also be perfectly good responses to the problem of divine hiddenness.
Again, Kvanvig expresses an idea like this:
If we consider the plausible candidates for such delimiting defeaters—
the value of freedom, necessity for a greater good, the importance of
soul-making, cognitive limitations, and the like—there is no particu-
lar reason to think that such responses succeed only for the general
problem of evil but not for the specific problem of divine hiddenness.
(Kvanvig 2001, 162)
We’ll consider three ways of unpacking this idea.
The first version begins from a “logical” or “deductive” version of the argument
from evil, which argues that evil is logically inconsistent with theism. If this were
so, having Evil as part of one’s evidence would take the probability of Theism all
the way to zero. A response to this logical problem of evil would be a way of
showing that it is possible for Theism and Evil to both be true. A classic example
of such a response is Plantinga’s free will defense (1974, ch. 10, 1978). Then this
version of Kvanvig’s idea says that, whatever your preferred strategy is for showing
that theism is compatible with evil in general, this strategy will work equally well
to show that theism is compatible with divine hiddenness in particular.
As a matter of logic, this doesn’t have to work out. Let us continue to grant that
divine hiddenness is just a special kind of evil. Still, just because hiddenness is a
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kind of evil, and evil is consistent with theism, it doesn’t follow that hiddenness
is consistent with theism. By analogy, horrendous evil is a special kind of evil,
but (as Adams (1989) argues) a generic way of showing that evil is consistent with
theism need not show that horrendous evil is consistent with theism. Or for a
simpler analogy, showing that being square is consistent with being red would not
show that being a blue square is consistent with being red.
Even so, there is surely something to this idea. Consider some defense that re-
sponds to the logical problem of evil: a possible story that entails both theism
and that there is evil. While such a defense does not automatically provide a re-
sponse to the “logical problem of hiddenness”—since the story may not entail di-
vine hiddenness—it isn’t too much of a stretch to think that the kinds of defenses
that are popular (freedom, soul-making, etc.) might be extended in a way that does
include divine hiddenness.
Furthermore, we do think that the way things have gone with the logical argument
from evil more broadly does strongly suggest that the prospects for a successful
logical argument from hiddenness are pretty dismal. Something that the usual
responses to the argument from evil show us is that there isn’t as tight a logical
connection between evil and theism as one might have concluded from, say, Epi-
curus’s famous formulation or Mackie’s (1955) classic presentation. The bridge
principles that such arguments rely on, between the goodness of the world and the
goodness of God, turn out to be subtle and far from evident. The same goes for
hiddenness: the track record of logical arguments from evil give us strong reason
to suspect that attempts at tight a priori derivations of a contradiction from the ex-
istence of a hidden God will have similar gaps. This isn’t a proof or even much of
an argument, but we think it is a pretty good hunch. In any case, we will not spend
any more time on logical arguments here.
The second version of the ideawe are exploring fromKvanvig takes up the opposite
idea: not that evil or hiddenness might drive the probability of theism to zero, but
that they might drive it down from one. How might this work? Plantinga has
suggested that the existence of God might itself be part of one’s evidence (see
footnote 2). In that case, theism would have probability one conditional on all
of one’s evidence. If there is any evidential problem of evil or hiddenness for
someone in such an epistemic position, then it must be because evil or hiddenness
bring about evidence loss. Evil or hiddenness might defeat theistic evidence, in
the sense that they block God’s existence from being part of one’s evidence at all.
Can evidence be defeated? Suppose you see someone put a red marble and a
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black marble in a bag—so you have as part of your evidence that there is a red
marble in the bag. They then randomly draw out a marble a hundred times with
replacement—and it’s black every time. It is natural—though controversial—to
think that this additional evidence defeats some evidence you initially had, namely,
that there is a red marble in the bag (Williamson 2000, 221–22).
Then the second version of the idea is that reasons for thinking that evil does not
defeat theistic evidence are also reasons for thinking that hiddenness does not de-
feat theistic evidence. On reflection, though, this is far from clear. First, we have
no good theory of evidence defeat. By our lights, this area of epistemology is very
up in the air.5 Second, though, even without a general theory we can see important
asymmetries between evil and hiddenness. There is a classic distinction between
rebutting defeat and undercutting defeat.6 Putting things very roughly, a rebutting
defeater for 𝑝 attacks the plausibility of 𝑝 itself, whereas undercutting defeat casts
doubt on the epistemic faculties that would deliver 𝑝 as evidence. Now, while facts
about suffering or moral evil may defeat evidence for God, it does not seem plausi-
ble that they are undercutting defeaters. But facts about hiddenness do seem to cast
a shadow over our God-directed epistemic faculties. For example, suppose one can
normally gain the existence of God as evidence through some quasi-perceptual sen-
sus divinitatus. Then one of the things that the cluster of facts we call “divine hid-
denness” shows us is that any such sense works at best very inconsistently across
times and between different people. Facts about the distribution of unbelief and re-
ligious experience provide reasons not to trust one’s evidence that there is a God,
even for those who are otherwise in a position to have it. By analogy, suppose
you look in the street and see a dog. Ordinarily this would provide you with per-
ceptual evidence that there is a dog. But if many other people look out the same
window and report that they don’t see anything out there, this is the kind of thing
that might well defeat your perceptual evidence. Hiddenness is a lot like this; evil
is not. This structural difference is a reason to suspect that responses to evil as an
evidence-defeater won’t generally give us responses to hiddenness as an evidence
defeater. We won’t defend this further here—and we emphasize that we have no
settled views on evidence defeat—but we think the disanalogy is suggestive.
For the third version, we now consider someone whose evidence leaves both athe-
ism and theism open as live possibilities—the probabilities are neither zero nor
5See Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) for criticisms of some natural theories one might propose; see
Goodman and Salow (2018) for an interesting recent alternative proposal.
6Pollock (1970) originally makes this distinction concerning justification; here we co-opt it for
talking about evidence defeat.
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one—and we consider arguments that merely aim to show that evil or hiddenness
is evidence against theism. The third version of Kvanvig’s claim is that hidden-
ness does no extra evidential work beyond evil, because there are responses to the
argument from evil that also respond to the argument from hiddenness.
So far we’ve been speaking abstractly and vaguely about the existence of some kind
of evil or other, and the existence of some kind of hiddenness or other. We’ll now
make things slightly more concrete. Instead of evil in general, let’s consider the
somewhat more specific fact that some people suffer pain—call this fact Suffering.
Instead of hiddenness in general, let’s consider the fact that some people do not
know that there is a God—call this fact Ignorance.
The idea we are considering says that various ways of replying to the problem
of suffering—possible stories about “the value of freedom, necessity for a greater
good, the importance of soul-making, cognitive limitations, and the like” (Kvanvig
2001, 162)—also blunt the force of hiddenness. Let’s grant that there are stories
like this that reconcile Theism with Suffering in the sense of showing these propo-
sitions to be mutually consistent. Let’s also grant that some of these stories also
reconcile Theism with Ignorance in the same sense (though, as we noted, this does
not come automatically). This is enough to block a logical argument from Igno-
rance against Theism. But it does not block an evidential argument from Ignorance
against Theism—even if an evidential argument from Suffering has already been
assimilated.
Let’s make this point more precise. Let a 𝑝-defense be a consistent proposition
that entails Theism & 𝑝.7 When we say that Ignorance does nothing extra once
Suffering has been taken into account, we mean that Ignorance is not evidence
against Theism conditional on Suffering. For this, it’s not enough that there are
some Suffering-defenses that are also Ignorance-defenses. What is required is that
every Suffering-defense is an Ignorance-defense. If there is any consistent proposi-
tion 𝐷 that entails Theism & Suffering but does not entail Theism & Ignorance, it
follows that 𝐷 & Theism & Suffering & not Ignorance has positive probability. In
that case, Theism & Suffering does not entail Ignorance. Meanwhile, not-Theism
does entail Ignorance: if there is no God, it follows that people do not know there
is a God (since knowledge is factive).8 Likewise, not-Theism & Suffering entails
7Here for simplicity we will make the Regularity assumption that each consistent proposition
has positive probability. In this case “𝑝 entails 𝑞” is equivalent to “the probability of 𝑝 and not 𝑞 is
zero.” This assumption is dispensable, but it makes things a little easier to state.
8We are assuming that the background evidential context includes the fact that there are people.
10
Ignorance. So
Pr(Ignorance ∣ Theism & Suffering) < Pr(Ignorance ∣ ¬Theism & Suffering)
This tells us that Ignorance is evidence against Theism conditional on Suffering.
Here is the lesson. For the logical problem of ignorance to be entirely subsumed
under the problem of suffering, it is enough that some Suffering-defense is an
Ignorance-defense. But for the evidential problem of ignorance to be entirely
subsumed under the problem of suffering, what’s required is that every Suffering-
defense is an Ignorance-defense. Any story that reconciles Theism and Suffering
but does not entail Ignorance provides a bit of the space of theistic possibilities
that Ignorance rules out, and (putting things a bit roughly) ruling out such theistic
possibilities is how evidence against Theism works.
Furthermore, it seems eminently plausible that there are Suffering-defenses that
are not Ignorance-defenses: possible stories in which there is God and suffering,
but no ignorance of God. Some vivid examples might be supplied by Ted Chiang’s
short story “Hell is the Absence of God,” Milton’s war in heaven in book VI of
Paradise Lost (supposing angels count as people—note that Milton has Satan suf-
fer pain), or when Adam and Eve are cursed in Genesis chapter 3. If these stories
are consistent theistic possibilities, then they count as Suffering-defenses that are
not Ignorance-defenses.9
This also illustrates a point we gestured at earlier: divine hiddenness need not be
bad to count against Theism. In fact, for ignorance of God to count against Theism,
all that is required is that given the truth of Theism, it might have turned out that
everyone knew it was true.
So far, we have argued that divine hiddenness can do extra evidential work even
once the problem of evil has been taken into account. In short, the problem of
hiddenness is not subsumed by the problem of evil. But there is still something
plausibly right in the vicinity: hiddenness is weaker evidence if evil has already
been taken into account than it would be otherwise.
If we spell out strength of evidence in a standard way—see below—then we can
say precisely what it takes for Ignorance to be weaker evidence against Theism
given Suffering than it is unconditionally: this holds if and only if Ignorance and
9This is not entirely clear, though, since it is not clear whether the character called “God” in
these stories really has the divine attributes of perfect goodness and power.
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Suffering are positively correlated given Theism. This intuitively means that, con-
ditional on Theism, Ignorance and Suffering each make the other more likely. It is
very plausible that this is true. So plausibly there is a good sense in which the prob-
lem of evil mitigates the force of the problem of divine hiddenness, even though it
does not completely subsume it.
But note that this relationship is symmetric. If Suffering and Ignorance are cor-
related given Theism, then likewise Suffering is weaker evidence against Theism
in the presence of Ignorance than it would be otherwise. So by the same token,
the problem of hiddenness mitigates the problem of evil (though again it does not
subsume it). It’s just a matter of historical accident that analytic philosophers of
religion paid a lot of attention to the problem of evil earlier than the problem of
hiddenness. This relationship gives no reason to think that one of these problems
is more important than the other.
Again, let’s spell this out in a bit more detail. Recall the standard Bayesian criterion
for evidence: 𝐸 is evidence against 𝐻 if and only if
Pr(𝐸 ∣ 𝐻) < Pr(𝐸 ∣ ¬𝐻)
There is also a standard Bayesian criterion for how strong evidence 𝐸 is for hy-
pothesis 𝐻 : it is simply a matter of how much greater Pr(𝐸 ∣ 𝐻) is compared to
Pr(𝐸 ∣ ¬𝐻). If Smoke is much more probable given Fire than given no Fire, then
Smoke is strong evidence for Fire. A standard measure is the ratio
Pr(Smoke ∣ Fire)
Pr(Smoke ∣ ¬Fire)
In general, the Bayes factor of evidence 𝐸 for hypothesis 𝐻 is the ratio
Pr(𝐸 ∣ 𝐻)
Pr(𝐸 ∣ ¬𝐻)
A large Bayes factor indicates that 𝐸 is strong evidence for 𝐻 , a small Bayes factor
greater than one indicates that 𝐸 is weak evidence for 𝐻 , and a Bayes factor less
than one indicates that 𝐸 is evidence against 𝐻 . Intuitively, the Bayes factor de-
scribes how big a “boost” certain evidence gives you.10 Similarly, the conditional
10To be precise, it tells you by what factor the odds of H should increase—Bayes factors are
multiplied, rather than added. (If you want something you can add, you can use the log Bayes
factor discussed in footnote 4.)
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Bayes factor of evidence 𝐸 for hypothesis 𝐻 given 𝐾 is
Pr(𝐸 ∣ 𝐻 & 𝐾)
Pr(𝐸 ∣ ¬𝐻 & 𝐾)
So the claim above—that Ignorance is weaker evidence against Theism given Suf-
fering than it is unconditionally—can be restated like this:
Pr(Ignorance ∣ Theism & Suffering)
Pr(Ignorance ∣ ¬Theism & Suffering) <
Pr(Ignorance ∣ Theism)
Pr(Ignorance ∣ ¬Theism) (1)
What it means for Ignorance and Suffering to be positively correlated given Theism
is
Pr(Suffering & Ignorance ∣ Theism)
> Pr(Suffering ∣ Theism) ⋅ Pr(Ignorance ∣ Theism) (2)
Themathematical point is that (1) and (2) are equivalent.11 The basic idea is that, if
you already know Theism is true, then both are ways of saying that, given Theism,
Suffering makes Ignorance less unexpected, and vice versa.
One more point about the relative strength of these two pieces of evidence is worth
making. It is natural to think that, supposing that a powerful God who loves
God’s creatures exists, while ignorance of God is somewhat surprising, it is not so
surprising—not nearly as surprising as the fact that creatures suffer pain. Suppose
this much is right: Ignorance is less surprising than Suffering given Theism. It
is tempting to conclude that Suffering is stronger evidence than Ignorance against
Theism. (That is, taking each piece of evidence unconditionally.) But this conclu-
sion does not follow.
11This equivalence again turns on the fact that ¬Theism entails Ignorance. But there is a more
general version of this fact as well, that holds for any evidence. 𝐸1 is weaker evidence against 𝐻
given 𝐸2 than it is unconditionally iff 𝐸1 and 𝐸2 are more correlated given 𝐻 than they are given
¬𝐻 . That is, to be precise:
Pr(𝐸1 ∣ 𝐻) Pr(𝐸2 ∣ 𝐻)
Pr(𝐸1 & 𝐸2 ∣ 𝐻)
< Pr(𝐸1 ∣ ¬𝐻) Pr(𝐸2 ∣ ¬𝐻)Pr(𝐸1 & 𝐸2 ∣ ¬𝐻)
.
(The case discussed in the main text follows from this, since Pr(Ignorance ∣ ¬Theism) = 1 and
Pr(Ignorance & Suffering ∣ ¬Theism) = Pr(Suffering ∣ ¬Theism).) Note that this general relation-
ship between 𝐸1 and 𝐸2 is, again, clearly symmetric. So the general point does not turn on the
factivity of knowledge: if suffering attenuates the evidential strength of hiddenness, then likewise
hiddenness attenuates the evidential strength of suffering.
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Imagine a celestial being, Celeste, visiting Earth. Celeste is a committed atheist.12
She learns about the existence of people and families and animals and such, but
has not yet learned anything yet about suffering, or pain, or other kinds of negative
experience. When she then finds out that some people suffer, this would come as at
least a bit of a surprise. We can grant (as Draper argues) that human suffering is less
surprising to Celeste than it would be to her theist counterpart. Still, this innocent
visitor had no reason to expect suffering. She might well have, like Gulliver, found
a planet of harmonious and serene Houyhnhnms. In contrast, given her atheism,
Celeste was fully confident that she would find that people don’t know there is a
God. While Suffering is surprising, Ignorance is no surprise at all.
Now, here is how Suffering might be more surprising than Ignorance to the theist,
while still being weaker evidence against Theism. What matters for the strength
of evidence of 𝐸 against Theism is the ratio between the probability of 𝐸 given
Theism and the probability of 𝐸 given not-Theism.
Pr(𝐸 ∣ Theism)
Pr(𝐸 ∣ ¬Theism)
But even if the numerator is lower when we plug Suffering in for 𝐸 than when we
plug in Ignorance, the denominator is also lower for Suffering than it is for Igno-
rance. Suffering comes as at least some surprise for the atheist, while Ignorance is
no surprise at all. So it could easily work out that the Bayes factor for Suffering is
smaller than the Bayes factor for Ignorance.
For concreteness, let’s plug in some numbers. (These numbers are just for illustra-
tion, and shouldn’t be taken literally.) Suppose Suffering is more surprising than
Ignorance given Theism:
Pr(Ignorance ∣ Theism) = 1/6
Pr(Suffering ∣ Theism) = 1/10
We also suppose that Suffering is fairly surprising given Atheism, too:
Pr(Suffering ∣ Atheism) = 1/2
Since knowledge is factive, we also have
Pr(Ignorance ∣ Atheism) = 1
12Draper (1989) uses a similar thought experiment to make a different point.
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With these values, while Suffering ismore surprising than Ignorance given Theism,
Suffering is weaker evidence than Ignorance against Theism. We can calculate the
Bayes factors:
Pr(Suffering ∣ Atheism)
Pr(Suffering ∣ Theism) = 5
Pr(Ignorance ∣ Atheism)
Pr(Ignorance ∣ Theism) = 6
So, given these parameters, Ignorance is stronger evidence than Suffering, despite
being less surprising. The argument “evil is more surprising than hiddenness for
the theist, so the argument from evil is stronger than the argument from hiddenness”
is invalid.
We have argued for three main things in this section.
(1) The problem of evil does not subsume the problem of divine hiddenness: in
particular, Ignorance makes an evidential difference even after Suffering has
been taken into account.
(2) The problem of evil does plausibly mitigate the problem of divine
hiddenness—and by the same token, the problem of divine hiddenness does
plausibly mitigate the problem of evil. That relationship is symmetric.
(3) Even if Suffering is less probable than Ignorance given Theism, Ignorance
may well be stronger evidence than Suffering against Theism.
We should acknowledge that we stacked the deck a bit by focusing on Ignorance
as our focal hiddenness fact throughout this discussion. We took advantage of
the factivity of knowledge, so Ignorance is sure to be true if there is no God (and
there are people). One worry about focusing on Ignorance is that for nearly any
proposition 𝑝, the fact that not everyone knows 𝑝 counts as evidence against p.13
But there may well be other evidence that counts just as strongly in the opposite
direction. Consider Ignorance of Atheism: the fact that not everyone knows there
is no God. This fact is clearly evidence for the existence of God: if there is a God,
then Ignorance of Atheism follows, while if there is no God then it might have
turned out that everyone knew this. So Ignorance of Theism is evidence against
Theism, and Ignorance of Atheism is evidence against Atheism.
While this much is true, there is no reason why these two pieces of evidence have to
13The exceptional case is where our background evidence guarantees that if 𝑝 is true then not
everyone knows 𝑝: for example, let 𝑝 be the proposition that someone does not know anything.
15
pull equally strongly in opposite directions. Both facts together will count against
Theism, given the following natural assumption:14
Pr(Knowledge of Theism ∣ Theism) > Pr(Knowledge of Atheism ∣ Atheism)
What this says is that the probability, given Theism, that everyone would know
Theism to be true is higher than the probability, given Atheism, that everyone
would know Atheism to be true. While this assumption is certainly not just a
matter of logic, it does seem like a very plausible judgment. Supposing there
is an all-powerful God that cares whether creatures know God exists, then it is
reasonable to expect creatures to know God exists. In contrast, the absence of
such a God does not raise the probability of our knowing about that absence to the
same degree—it isn’t as if the absence might will itself to be known and have the
power to effect its will.
So we don’t think that the problem of Ignorance is so trivial that it was a waste of
time to analyze it. Still, there is much more to be done. As we have noted, there
are many different arguments from hiddenness—many different respects in which
our epistemic and experiential condition is obscure, which might count against
there being a God. These different facts can’t all be dealt with in one go. Things
are more complicated for hiddenness facts that are contingent given Atheism—
such as that some people don’t believe in God. The evidential force of these facts
will depend on more plausibility considerations, and in general will not be quite
as logically airtight as the case of Ignorance. Even so, the simple case illustrates
some important structural points. The relationship between hiddenness and evil
does not render hiddenness irrelevant once we have taken evil into account. But the
substantive question of how significant various hiddenness facts really are needs
further exploration.
3 Conceptions of God
Michael Rea writes:
14Write 𝐾𝑇 for Knowledge of Theism and 𝐾𝐴 for Knowledge of Atheism. For both ignorance
claims together to count as evidence against Theism, it is sufficient that
Pr(¬𝐾𝑇 & ¬𝐾𝐴 ∣ Theism) < 𝑃 𝑟(¬𝐾𝑇 & ¬𝐾𝐴 ∣ ¬Theism).
Since Theism entails ¬𝐾𝐴, the left side is equal to Pr(¬𝐾𝑇 ∣ Theism). Likewise, since ¬Theism
entails ¬𝐾𝑇 , the right side is equal to Pr(¬𝐾𝐴 ∣ ¬Theism). So the left side is less than the right
side iff Pr(𝐾𝑇 ∣ Theism) > Pr(𝐾𝐴 ∣ ¬Theism).
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The problem of divine hiddenness … depends for its traction on con-
testable theological assumptions. Accordingly, one might just as eas-
ily take the problem not as a referendum on the existence of God, but
rather on the viability of certain ways of understanding the nature of
God and God’s attributes. (2018, 6, original emphasis)
Rea argues that the problem of hiddenness “fails to target belief in the Christian
God” when this is spelled out in a theologically substantive way and distinguished
from other “very different conceptions of God” (pp. 22–23, original emphasis). In
particular, Rea argues that God is transcendent, where this is to be understood in a
sufficiently “dark” way (see chapters 3–4), undermining “any reason for thinking
that God’s love would preclude divine hiddenness” (p. 8).
We will argue that, when the problem of hiddenness is understood as an evidential
argument, there isn’t a clean division between arguments against the existence of
God and arguments against “certain ways of understanding the nature of God and
God’s attributes.” In fact, the problem of divine hiddenness is both of these things.
We should again distinguish between logical and evidential arguments. If what
you’re trying to show is that hiddenness is not conclusive evidence against the
existence of God, then it suffices to show that there is some epistemically possible
way Godmight be that is consistent with hiddenness. But hiddenness can be strong
evidence against the existence of God without being fully conclusive; and the fact
that some conceptions of God are compatible with hiddenness does not show that
this is not the case.
Moving from a broader “conception” of God to amore specific onemeans eliminat-
ing various live possibilities of how God might be. Unless this change is balanced
off by also eliminating some ways the world might be if there is no God, then this
means that the God possibilities make up a smaller proportion of logical space
than before. This is precisely what disconfirmation amounts to in a Bayesian set-
ting. So if divine hiddenness prompts us to adopt a more specific conception of
God, without any other epistemic revision, then it is evidence against the existence
of God.
Consider an analogy. You think that Aisha might give you flowers, though she also
might not. You know the local flower shop sells several different kinds of flowers:
roses, daisies, tulips. Your friend Orrie knows what Aisha is up to. You say, “I
don’t want to know anything else, but is Aisha giving me roses?” Orrie says no. If
the only relevant thing you have learned is Aisha is not giving me roses, then this is
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evidence against Aisha giving you flowers. You might be tempted to think, “Well,
she still might give me daisies or tulips. I should just become more confident that
it is one of those, without losing confidence that she will give me flowers.” This is
half right: you should be more confident that Aisha is giving you daisies or tulips.
But you should still be less confident that she will give you any flowers at all.
In the diagram (fig. 1), when Roses are eliminated this leaves more room for the
other possibilities: No Flowers, Daisies, and Tulips all get probability boosts. For
example, if the prior probabilities are 1/2 for No Flowers, and 1/6 for each of Roses,
Daisies, or Tulips, then the posterior probability for No Flowers goes up to 3/5 and
the probabilities for Daisies and Tulips each go up to 1/5. So the probability that
Aisha gives you flowers goes down from 1/2 to 2/5. In general, for any hypothesis
𝐻 , any evidence that merely rules out a way for 𝐻 to be true is evidence against
𝐻 being true, while simultaneously being evidence for any remaining ways for 𝐻
to be true. When we rule out “certain ways of understanding” 𝐻 (namely Roses),
this also amounts to evidence against 𝐻 .15
Roses Daisies Tulips No Flowers
1/6 1/6 1/6 1/2
1/5 1/5 3/5
Figure 1: Eliminating one possible kind of flowers.
It’s very natural, when confronted with evidence against one’s view, to adapt the
view to accommodate that evidence without losing confidence. But this is a mis-
take. Consider someonewho believes the Earth is flat—call this the Simple Theory.
When confronted with photos of the Earth taken from space they argue: “My view
is not just that the Earth is flat, but also that NASA is attempting to deceive us into
believing the Earth is round by publishing fake photos.” Call this the Extended
15Draper (2011) gives an analogous argument against a similar movemade by the skeptical theist.
Even if evil is not evidence against a specific version of theism—namely, skeptical theism—evil is
still less likely given theism than it is given atheism, and thus still evidence against theism. This
can be so even though it is also evidence for skeptical theism.
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Theory. Note that the existence of photos showing a round Earth is not evidence
against the Extended Theory: it is in fact exactly what the Extended Theory pre-
dicts. So the flat Earther supposes that they have no epistemic price to pay: the
flat Earther merely adopts a more specific “conception” of the flat Earth, and this
conception is not threatened by the photographic evidence.
It’s true that the photos are not evidence against the Extended Theory, but they
are still evidence against the Simple Theory that the Earth is flat. Furthermore,
the overall reasons against the Extended Theory, in the light of the photographic
evidence, are at least as strong as the reasons against the Simple Theory: that is, the
Extended Theory is even less probable than the discredited Simple Theory. This is
not because the photos are evidence against the Extended Theory, but because the
Extended Theory has much smaller prior probability than the Simple Theory—
because it is much more specific. Thus its probability is lower than the probability
of those two things both being true, which is to say:
Pr(Extended Theory) < Pr(Simple Theory ∣ Photos) ≪ Pr(Simple Theory)
So even though the photos are not evidence against the Extended Theory, this is not
to that theory’s credit.16 The flat earther’s ad hoc shenanigans give rise to a theory
with lower posterior probability, not higher—and this posterior probability is what
matters in the end. You can always cook the books and hide disconfirmation, by
trading it in for lower prior probability. But this is no help.
This can be easy to miss, because our intuitive probability judgments are subject to
cognitive biases. More specific, detail-rich stories often strike us asmore plausible
than simple, spare stories. A famous illustration of this is the “bank teller fallacy”
(see Kahneman 2011, ch. 15): most people judge that it is more probable that a
certain character, Linda, is a feminist bank teller than that she is simply a bank
teller, given a background story that primes them to think of feminism. But of
course the laws of probability guarantee that
Pr(Feminist & Bank Teller) ≤ Pr(Bank Teller)
The more detailed story coheres better and seems more vivid, and thus can seem
more credible, even though it is in fact less likely to be true. Similarly, the Extended
Flat Earth Theory can seem vivid and narratively satisfying in a way that belies its
low probability.
16Compare Benton, Hawthorne, and Isaacs (2016, sec. 5). Perrine andWykstra (2014, 150) give
a different example to make a similar point.
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Simple Flat Earth Theory Round Earth
Extended
TheoryPhotos
Figure 2: Switching to a more specific theory that fits the evidence. (Not to scale.)
The mere consistency of the Extended Theory does show that the Simple Theory is
at least consistent with the photographic evidence—in other words, that evidence
against the Simple Theory is not utterly conclusive. But that’s a low bar to clear.
The flat earther’s shenanigans are clearly disreputably ad hoc: the Extended The-
ory is just engineered to accommodate counterevidence, with no independent moti-
vation. To be clear, we are not saying that this is what’s going on with transcendent
conceptions of God like that which Rea defends—we are not accusing Rea of the
same ad hockery as the conspiracy theorist. Rea’s motivation for accepting such
a conception is not for the sake of an escape route from the problem of divine
hiddenness; rather, he thinks that it is to be found in “the contents of scripture
and tradition,” and he holds that “we need to conduct our theorizing at least to
some extent, if possible, within a framework of concepts that are revealed by these
sources” (p. 60). In this way, transcendence may be an independently motivated
specification of theism, in contrast to the flat earther’s purely ad hoc Extended
Theory.
The main point the flat earth example is meant to illustrate is that one cannot make
one’s view more credible in the face of disconfirming evidence simply by adopting
a more specific view—even though the more detailed theory may seem intuitively
more satisfying. If responding to divine hiddenness byway of “historically and the-
ologically informed exploration and defense of the assumptions about God” (Rea
2018, 7–8) is to provide an argument that hiddenness is not evidence against God,
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then it has to be doing something else besidesmerely eliminating certain ways God
might be from the space of epistemic possibilities. We’ll consider two options.
First, theological inquiry might introduce new epistemic possibilities that were not
previously under consideration. This usually goes under the heading of “expanding
awareness” (for overview, see Schipper 2015; Steele and Stefánsson, forthcoming,
and references therein). When a new scientific theory is proposed, such as evolu-
tion by natural selection or special relativity, this is a kind of epistemic advance
that does not seem to consist in gaining evidence that eliminates certain epistemic
possibilities. The most natural way to think about this kind of advance is as an
expansion of the space of possibilities that are assigned probabilities at all. We
might think about theological inquiry as working similarly.17
We think this is an intriguing idea well worth exploring, but there is not space
here to do it justice—our remarks will be brief and tentative. Unlike the case of
ordinary Bayesian updating by learning new propositions, there is no standard the-
ory of updating by expanding awareness of possibilities—though there are various
competing proposals (for example, Karni and Vierø 2013). Any application of this
idea to the philosophy of religion must be speculative.
It is natural to think that introducing new theistic possibilities—say, a new con-
ception of God as transcendent—would be a way of increasing the probability of
theism. After all, the new conception should get some probability assigned to it,
and it also doesn’t seem like this should detract from the probability of the con-
ceptions one already possessed. If adding a new conception of God increases the
probability of theism, then when we go on to reject some of the old conceptions,
theism may end up on net no worse off than it began. But we tentatively think that
it should not really work this way. First, the facile argument we just suggested
seems wrong. The probabilities of all the possibilities taken together should still
add up to one, just like before, and the probability of the previously unconsidered
theistic conception has to come from somewhere. So we can’t add extra probabil-
ity to a new conception without taking away from anything else—and there is no
obvious reason why it should be only atheistic hypotheses that bear the loss.
Consider the example of Aisha’s flowers again. Suppose you become aware of kind
of flower you had never before imagined: ranunculuses. What should happen now
to the probability you assign to Aisha giving you flowers? It’s hard to say, but a
natural answer is that it should stay the same. But it also doesn’t seem like you
17Draper (2014, 172) considers this possibility in passing.
21
should become less confident that she will give you roses, or that she will give you
tulips, etc. Rather, the view we prefer is that, given the possibility of being given
ranunculuses, the original allocation of probabilities (1/2 to no flowers and 1/6
to each of roses, tulips, and daisies) was simply wrong—not proportioned to the
evidence. The correct probability assignment would reserve some probability for
other unimagined kinds of flowers all along. (For overview and critical discussion
of various approaches in this spirit, see Steele and Stefánsson, forthcoming, sec.
6.2.) The probability of ranunculuses comes from the probability that you should
have assigned to “unknown unknown” kinds of flower—the “none of the above”
option, as it were.
In general, it would be hubris—and more to the point, not warranted by one’s
evidence—to assign no probability to there being relevant possibilities that one has
not considered. The picture is that the possibilities of which one is “unaware” are
still lurking in logical space, receiving evidential probabilities—you just haven’t
thought about those possibilities or their probabilities yet. This picture will, of
course, be controversial, as will any view on this subject matter, but we think it is
promising. If it is right, then even if theological inquiry does turn up new uncon-
sidered possibilities, this is not a way of adding to the probability of theism; nor is
it a way of avoiding the conclusion that the probability of theism goes down when
the same inquiry leads us to eliminate theistic possibilities we had previously been
aware of.
The second option for what might be happening in theological inquiry, besides
merely eliminating theistic possibilities, is that one might be adducing evidence
that also eliminates some atheistic possibilities. This might sound surprising—
how could theorizing about God’s attributes tell us about what the world is like
even if there is no God? We think this idea has some promise, though it is not a
straightforward matter whether it will ultimately be defensible.
Buchak (2014) defends an idea proposed by Perrine and Wykstra (2014) that
“learning which precisification of a general theory is the most plausible needn’t
always make the general theory less likely relative to the alternatives” (Buchak
2014, 186). In their discussion, the “general theory” at issue is theism, and the
“precisification” is skeptical theism. Perrine andWykstra argue that the facts about
evil might lead one to become more confident in skeptical theism, conditional on
theism, without becoming any less confident in theism. Buchak says that this can
be made sense of, if “what the data about evil supports is the conditional claim
that if theism is true then skeptical theism is true” (2014, 182). Crucially, this
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conditional claim should not be understood as a material conditional, equivalent
to “Either theism is false or skeptical theism is true.” Updating on this material
conditional would amount to simply eliminating certain theistic possibilities (the
non-skeptical ones), which would diminish the probability of theism, as we have
discussed. Rather, Buchak points out that the conditional claim can alternatively
be construed as an indicative conditional, and that one can in principle learn the
indicative conditional if Theism, then Skeptical Theism without becoming any
less confident in Theism. She offers this analogy:
For example, you assign equal probability to the hypothesis that your
friend is in town (𝐴) and the hypothesis that he is out of town ( ̄𝐴).
There are five coffee shops in town, three Pete’s and two Starbucks,
and knowing nothing else, you assign equal probability to his being at
each (with 𝐴𝐵 representing his being in town at a Pete’s and 𝐴 ̄𝐵 his
being in town at a Starbucks). You then learn that he hates Starbucks,
so if he’s in town, he won’t be there – therefore, you can rule out 𝐴 ̄𝐵
. Intuitively, though, learning this fact shouldn’t make you think it
more likely that he is out of town. (Buchak 2014, 184–85)
The picture is that one can redistribute the “in town” probability from Starbucks
to Peet’s, while keeping its total probability the same.
Buchak (2014, 185) considers various non-standard rules from the Bayesian lit-
erature for updating on indicative conditionals that deliver this result. We prefer
to focus on a less revisionary version: we don’t need a newfangled updating rule
if we accept the straightforward view that an indicative conditional expresses a
proposition that is stronger than a mere material conditional. That is, an indicative
conditional is true at some worlds and false at others, and it need not be true in
every world where the antecedent is false. One popular theory like this (Stalnaker
1968) says that the conditional if 𝐴, then 𝐵 is true at just those worlds such that
the closest 𝐴-world is a 𝐵-world. In the coffee shop example, the indicative con-
ditional if my friend is in town, he isn’t at Starbucks does not merely rule out the
possibility of being in town and at Starbucks. This alone would disconfirm him be-
ing in town. But this information also tells us something non-trivial about what the
world is like if your friend is out of town: it rules out those out-of-town worlds for
which the closest in-town world is a Starbucks-world. Furthermore, in this story it
is natural to say that the probability of these out-of-town worlds exactly balances
off the probability of the corresponding in-town worlds: whether the friend is in
town or out of town does not make a difference to which coffee shop he goes to
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if he is in town. (For the out of town worlds, we might imagine that the closest
in-town world is one that matches his coffee-shop-choice dispositions, and those
dispositions are the same whether or not he is in town. Note that if we know if he
is in town, he is at Peet’s or Starbucks, then by the Stalnaker semantics we also
know the disjunction if he is in town, he is at Peet’s or if he is in town, he is at
Starbucks: so, in particular, every out-of-town world is one where one or the other




In Town Out of Town
If In Town, Starbucks
If In Town, Peets
Figure 3: Learning an indicative conditional.
But we need not get bogged down here in technicalities; we can make the central
point without worrying about the semantics of conditionals. In the coffee shop
case, it is easy to find non-conditional evidence that does the relevant work. The
way you learn if my friend is in town, he is not at Starbucks is by learning the
stronger andmore straightforward propositionmy friend hates Starbucks and never
goes there. It is clear that there are worlds in which this proposition is false and
the friend is out of town. Indeed, this information is on its face independent of
whether your friend is in town. (There is no reason to think your friend’s coffee
preferences are connected to his travel plans.) You do also learn that the material
conditional is true—either my friend is not in town or my friend is not at Starbucks.
But if you already knowmy friend is not at Starbucks, then the material conditional
does not tell you anything extra. So, while the material conditional on its own is
evidence against your friend being in town, when it is combined with the additional
information that your friend never goes to Starbucks, it is not.
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Recall the contrast between the flat earther’s obviously ad hoc modification of their
theory and the much less conspicuously disreputable move from generic theism
to a more specific conception of God as appropriately transcendent, which Rea
motivates by appeal to scripture and tradition (rather than as a mere escape hatch
from counterevidence). The question is whether this helps: that is, whether this
appeal to additional theological data can get you from generic theism to the more
specific version without losing any probability along the way. The way this might
work is if the theological data tells us something non-trivial about what the world
is like if there is no God. We have now seen one way that this can work in principle.
Apparently “theological” evidence, like the indicative conditional if Theism, then
Skeptical Theism—or likewise, if Theism, then God is transcendent—can work
like this. There are epistemically possible worlds in which there is no God and the
conditional is false.
It can be tricky to pin down the truth conditions of indicative conditionals. As
in the coffee shop case, though, often the way we learn a conditional is by learn-
ing something stronger—like my friend never goes to Starbucks. We can make
headway by just focusing on the more straightforward stronger information. In the
case at hand, the stronger information that Rea appeals to is “the contents of scrip-
ture and tradition.” Scripture and tradition need not have said precisely what they
do, supposing there is no God. So propositions of the form “scripture and tradi-
tion say …” rule out not just certain theistic possibilities, but also certain atheistic
possibilities. They could, in principle, be the sort of additional information that
makes transcendence an independently motivated modification of theism rather
than merely ad hoc.
There are two different reasons for believing the theological conditional if there
is a God, God is transcendent. One reason is that we might infer it from divine
hiddenness facts. But this way of learning the conditional lowers the probability
of theism to precisely the extent that divine hiddenness counts as evidence against
theism. So learning the theological conditional this way does not help the prob-
ability of theism. But another reason for believing the conditional is on the ba-
sis of scripture and tradition. The question before us now is whether this reason
counts as suitably independent from the reason given by divine hiddenness facts
themselves—in particular, whether this might be a way of learning the theological
conditional that does not lower the probability of theism.
Let’s consider a simple toy model. Imagine that we do not know yet whether God
is hidden. (We will use “God is hidden” as a shorthand for some fact about the dis-
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tribution of religious belief and experience—say, that many people do not believe
in or experience God. In particular, God being hidden should not be understood
to entail that God exists.) Suppose that we do know that if God exists and is hid-
den, then God is transcendent, and likewise that if God exists and is not hidden,
then God is not transcendent. (This is obviously an over-simplification, but it will
help keep things tidy.) Let the probability that God is transcendent conditional
on theism be 1/2. We will conduct some basic theological inquiry by consulting
a local prophet. To keep things simple, suppose we know that the prophet is a
perfectly reliable reporter on God’s attributes if there is a God—but not otherwise.
The prophet comes down from the mountaintop and announces, “God is transcen-
dent.” One thing we thereby learn is if there is a God, God is transcendent. We
learned this conditional by way of a simpler unconditional piece of information:
the prophet says God is transcendent.
How should we update on this information? This depends on something we have
not specified in the story so far: what we think the prophet is up to if there is no
God. When the prophet goes up the mountain, if there is a God she receives the
truth about God’s transcendence, and faithfully reports it. But if there is no God,
what then? Let’s suppose that the prophet simply makes her best guess as to what
God is like, supposing there is a God. We can consider two different versions of
how this story goes in the case where there is no God.
First version. The prophet does not already knowwhether God is hidden. Then the
prophet also doesn’t know (if there is a God) whether God is transcendent. So we’ll
suppose she guesses at random: she is equally likely to say “God is transcendent”
or “God is not transcendent.”18
In this case, the evidence the prophet says God is transcendent is independent of
theism. If there is a God, then the probability that the prophet would say God
is transcendent is 1/2 (because that’s how likely it is to be true). And if there is
no God, then the probability that the prophet would say this, by guessing, is 1/2
again. So in this version of the story, we do learn from the prophet the conditional
information if there is a God, God is transcendent in a way that does not lower the
probability of theism.
This illustrates the best-case scenario. In this situation, the theological views we
derive from the prophet’s report are genuinely independently motivated. It is pos-
18More generally, if the Pr(Transcendence ∣ Theism) = 𝑝, then the prophet should decide what
to say based on flipping a weighted coin which comes up heads with probability 𝑝.
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sible to learn conditional facts about God in a way that does not merely eliminate
theistic possibilities, and so does not disconfirm theism, and which sets theism up
to escape disconfirmation by hiddenness as well. The key thing that makes this
possible is that the prophet’s report is contingent given atheism, and not just given
theism; and furthermore, this report is unlikely given atheism to the same degree










Figure 4: First version of the prophet toy model (not to scale).
Second version. In this version, the prophet does know whether God is hidden—
that is, she knows about the distribution of religious belief and experience. Now
what does the prophet do, in the case where there is no God? There are two pos-
sibilities. The first is that the prophet knows that God is indeed hidden. Then she
also knows the conditional if there is a God, God is transcendent. So she will say
“God is transcendent.” The second possibility is that the prophet knows God is not
hidden—that is, she knows that religious belief and experience are pervasive. If
she knows this, we suppose that she will say “God is not transcendent.”
In this version, the news the prophet says “God is transcendent” is itself evidence
against theism, as long as hiddenness would be. For in fact, in this version of the
toy model, we know in advance that the prophet will say “God is transcendent” if
and only if God is in fact hidden: the two pieces of evidence are equivalent. So
the prophet’s report is evidence against theism to the very same extent as divine
hiddenness.
In the first version, the prophet’s report is arrived at independently from divine hid-
denness. Accordingly, it provides an independent motivation for the theological
conditional if there is a God, God is transcendent, and provides a way of learn-








Prophet says God is transcendent
Hiddenness,
No God
Figure 5: Second version of the prophet toy model (not to scale).
known, divine hiddenness itself comes as no surprise conditional on theism, and
so it does not make theism any less probable either. (In fact, now divine hidden-
ness confirms theism!) In the second version, though, the prophet’s report is itself
informed by divine hiddenness, rather than being arrived at independently. In this
case, the prophet’s report is itself evidence against theism: hiddenness is evidence
against theism, we can deduce from the prophet’s report that God is hidden. Af-
ter we have updated on the prophet’s report, hiddenness itself does not provide
any further evidence against theism, but that’s just because the damage is already
done.
Obviously both versions of the toy model are simplistic, but they illustrate an im-
portant point. Insofar as the contents of scripture and tradition are shaped by divine
hiddenness (as in the second version), rather than independently from it (as in the
first), two things happen. The good news for the theist is that, if you have already
taken this scripture and tradition on board, then divine hiddenness itself will not
do much extra work. If you already know for theological reasons if there is a God,
God is hidden, then divine hiddenness is unsurprising and does not tell against
theism. The bad news is that the evidence against theism has simply been relo-
cated. The theological data itself counts against theism. Basically, in this case the
theological data encodes divine hiddenness: it says what it says in response to the
evident fact that not everyone shares the same experience of the divine. So this
data is itself evidence against God, to the same extent that divine hiddenness is
evidence against God in the absence of that theological data. The epistemic cost
of divine hiddenness has been woven into the theological tradition itself.
Moreover, it seems clear that scripture and tradition—and in particular the support
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they give for the view that God is transcendent in a way that inspires humility in
our expectations of epistemic access to God—are shaped by divine hiddenness,
rather than arising independently from it. So while of course neither version of
the toy model is realistic, it is plausible that actual scripture and tradition is more
like the second prophet than the first.
Recall the claim from Rea we began this section with: that the problem of divine
hiddenness is not a “referendum on the existence of God, but rather on the viability
of certain ways of understanding the nature of God and God’s attributes” (Rea
2018, 6). Rea himself seems to be focusing on deductive arguments against the
existence of God; we have been investigating whether this move can be effective
against an evidential argument from divine hiddenness. We first observed that
if one deems certain ways of understanding God unviable, and makes no other
epistemic change, then this is a way of lowering the probability that God exists. So
if the move is going to work, something else must be happening. We considered
two ways this might go. First, theological inquiry might introduce new epistemic
possibilities. Our investigation of this idea is only preliminary, but we are not
optimistic that this will help theism. Second, theological inquiry might eliminate
certain atheistic possibilities. We have seen that, in principle, this can work, and
keep theism from being disconfirmed by hiddenness. But it won’t work if the
theological data that forms the basis for one’s conception of God itself smuggles
in the problem of divine hiddenness.
In any case, the challenge is clear. In order to argue that the evidential problem of
divine hiddenness can be avoided by adopting a more specific conception of God,
motivated by scripture and tradition, the following question must be answered:
what should we have expected the contents of scripture and tradition to be like
in the case where there is no God? The challenge for those who wish to appeal
to scripture and tradition to escape the evidential argument from hiddenness is to
make it plausible that scripture and tradition provide a conception of divine tran-
scendence which—supposing there is no God!—is not itself based on observing
divine hiddenness.
Worries have often been raised about appealing to distinctive religious doctrine
as a response to problems for theism. For example, Schellenberg (2007, 197–98)
writes that “our job as philosophers … is to think for ourselves”; so “we cannot
take as our guide a picture of God fashioned by theology.” And Plantinga protests,
But am I not somehow begging the question by bringing in these other
religious beliefs, such as that God’s creatures have fallen into sin?
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Well, why so? Can’t I use all that I believe in this context? (1996,
256–57)
Note that the challenge we have raised here is different. The difficulty with appeals
to “theological data” is not that they are illegitimate, unphilosophical, question-
begging, or circular. The problem is that taking this kind of data seriously just
doesn’t help as much as you might think. A theological tradition that contends
with divine hiddenness, and provides resources for explaining it, can make divine
hiddenness unsurprising. But in so doing, that theological tradition itself can count
as evidence against theism just as strongly.
We have been discussing evidence of the form “scripture and tradition say 𝑝.” But
we should also consider an alternative construal of the evidence provided by scrip-
ture and tradition. What if the proposition 𝑝 itself were part of your evidence
instead? As we noted in footnote 2, we can find an argument for this kind of
view in Plantinga. For example, perhaps the original authors of scripture gained
knowledge of what they spoke by direct illumination from God, and then they suc-
cessfully transmitted this knowledge through testimony.
This kind of picture makes things very simple. One of the propositions among the
contents of scripture and tradition is that God exists. If this proposition is part of
your evidence, then, given this evidence, nothing counts as evidence against the
existence of God.19 In that case, there are no evidential arguments against the ex-
istence of God, whether from evil, divine hiddenness, or anything else. (Likewise,
for anyone who has the nonexistence of God as part of their evidence, nothing
further would count as evidence for or against the existence of God, either.)
It not clear whether anyone really has such religious doctrines as evidence. There
are many points of controversy here, including whether the doctrines are true,
whether a sufficiently broad conception of evidence is correct, and whether evi-
dence that might be available via testimony or other kinds of revelation is disrupted
by defeaters. But even those theists who think that theism is part of their evidence
can take some lessons from this essay’s explorations.
First, it is interesting and non-trivial to investigate the structure of evidential sup-
port among their other beliefs, setting direct theistic evidence aside. Second, even
if religious propositions are part of some people’s evidence, many other people do
19If the existence of God is part or your evidence, then it has probability one conditional on
your total evidence. So no other evidence can lower its probability, unless it can make you lose the
evidence you already have.
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not have this advantage: clearly many people do not know that they are true. This
includes atheists and agnostics; it also includes many who believe these doctrines,
and perhaps for whom the doctrines are probable on their evidence, but for whom
they do not rise to the status of evidence themselves. We are interested in the ra-
tionality of belief or disbelief in God for these people, too, and not just for the
evidentially most advantaged.
Finally, the main thing we have been doing in this essay is responding to certain
objections to an evidential argument from divine hiddenness: first, that it is sub-
sumed by the problem of evil, and second, that it can be successfully responded
to by adopting a more specific conception of God. But if the existence (or non-
existence) of God is itself treated as part of one’s evidence, that wouldn’t make
these objections correct. Instead, the argument from divine hiddenness would
simply be trivialized in a way that has nothing to do with the problem of evil or
conceptions of God. This dialectic makes the most sense in a context where the
question of the existence of God is treated as live.
Our world is one in which knowledge and experience of God are elusive. This is by
nomeans conclusive evidence against God’s existence, but that is not to say it is not
powerful evidence even so. This evidence interacts with other relevant evidence in
subtle ways. It is not subsumed by the problem of evil; neither are those two kinds
of evidence completely independent. Nor is it easily escaped by those who have
already embraced God’s obscurity as a deliverance of their theological tradition.
We have not argued directly that divine hiddenness is strong evidence against the
existence of God, but we have cleared away some important reasons for thinking
that it is not.
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